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Christianity but with the disadvantage that on this view God is less like-
ly to be justified in permitting evil. In other words, the open view faces 
the same difficulties as traditional Christianity but with fewer resources 
to meet them. That does not strike me as an advantage. 
Despite the laudable concern these authors have for developing a 
position that is both biblically sound and adequate for a rich religious 
life, the view they present, as I have tried to make explicit, is not only a 
radical departure from traditional Christianity but it is a departure not 
justified by the reasons they cite in its favor. 
NOTES 
1. One of the authors, William Hasker, in God, Time, and Knowledge 
(Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1989) interprets this prophecy 
not as conditional but as a prediction "based on foresight drawn from exist-
ing trends and tendencies" (p. 194). Under either interpretation it is possible 
for the prophecy to be made but to be unfulfilled, either because the relevant 
condition-whatever it is-is unsatisfied or because the current trends are 
reversed or overridden. 
2. J.T. McNeil's The History and Character of Calvinism (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1954) is not primarily a history of the doctrine of 
theological determinism! 
3. See his God, Time and Knowledge and "A Refutation of Middle 
Knowledge," Nous 20 (1986): 545-57. 
4. See Thomas P. Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Freedom," Philosophical 
Studies 60 (1990): 103-115 and "In Defense of Theological Compatibilism," 
Faith and Philosophy 8 (1991): 237-243, as well as Alfred J. Freddoso, "Review 





Calvin, Institutes, I, xvii, 7. 
Ibid. I, xvii, 11. 
A similar claim may be made about the evils Hasker cites on p. 146. 
The Sources of Christian Ethics, by Servais Pinckaers OP. Washington 
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1995. Pp. xxi and 489. 
$24.95. 
JAMES G. HANINK, Loyola Marymount University. 
"It is difficult," Pinckaers notes, "to describe a situation while living in 
the midst of all its complexity ... " (304) It's perhaps equally hard to iden-
tify a classic within a decade of its writing and a year of its translation 
for Anglophone readers. Still, Pinckaers's Sources is a contender. 
The author, a Belgian, teaches theology at the University of Fribourg. 
Sources appeared as Les sources de la morale chretienne in 1985, and 
Pinckaers tells us he wrote it for a broad audience. His text is straight-
forward and ambitious. Pinckaers first defines Christian ethics and then 
examines its relation to the behavioral sciences, to Scripture, and to the 
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teaching of Augustine and Aquinas. Next he charts the history of his 
subject from the patristic era to the post-Vatican II period. Lastly, he 
explores the relation between freedom and law and between freedom 
and nature. In this he presages John Paul II's Veritatis Splendor. 
When one reviews a (maybe!) classic, sobriety is in order. How do it 
justice? Simplicity is best. I first note what I simply omit from discus-
sion. Then I identify the parts of the text which I want to underscore-
and do so. Finally, I consider two issues (among many) which demand 
further analysis. 
What must I simply omit? Too much: Pinckaers' account of Paul's 
Christocentrism; his charting of Christian ethics over two millennia; his 
view of Catholic-Protestant debates. The price of economy is high. It 
was, after all, Vatican II's call to reintegrate moral theology and 
Scripture (though not, he warns, via technical exegesis) that inspired 
Pinckaers. Yet apart from his reading of the Sermon on the Mount, con-
ciseness must rule. It is this rule, however, that allows me to underscore 
five of Pinckaers' key themes and point to their significance. 
For a start, what is Christian ethics? Pinckaers defines it as "the 
branch of theology that studies human acts so as to direct them to a lov-
ing vision of God seen as our true, complete happiness and our final 
end." (8) He immediately adds that we win this vision "by means of 
grace, the virtues, and the gifts [of the Spirit], in the light of revelation 
and reason." (8) The definition is critical for what it says and for what it 
omits. It focuses on neither law, nor duty, nor a subjective happiness, 
nor a schema of values, nor conscience. Its strength, rather, is a recapitu-
lation of the sources of Christian life and a recognition of its telos: the joy 
of knowing God. 
Our next step is to ground Christian ethics in Scripture, in particular, 
the Sermon on the Mount. For Augustine the "Sermon of the Lord" 
announces Gospel ethics "based on the Lord's own words." (142) 
Pinckaers develops Augustine's reading of the Sermon as the primary 
text of Christian ethics and his teaching that only in the Spirit can we fol-
low Christ's way to happiness. This hermeneutic is noteworthy in that it 
does justice to the radical character of the primitive Christian ethos. It 
does so, moreover, in harmony with the trinitarian dynamic which the 
Fathers articulated. With Pinckaers, one never wonders about the force 
of Christian ethics; the question is how to order its power. 
A third theme Pinckaers pursues is the disordering of the dynamism 
of Christian ethics that emerges from the nominalist turn. Here Ockham 
is the chief player. Ockham's conceptual brief, though, leads us beyond 
the claims that only individuals exist and that universals are but labels. 
His freedom, Pinckaers finds, is "the power to choose between con-
traries, independently of all other causes except freedom, or the will 
itself-whence the term freedom of indifference." (242) 
Such freedom isolates the human act from both its agent's past and 
future. Virtue and finality fall away. Obligation supplants natural incli-
nation. But obligation itself stems from God's will. Indeed, to preserve 
God's freedom, Ockham teaches that "God can command the created 
will to hate him" in this world and the next. (247) So the wisdom of 
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sequi naturam yields to the paradoxes of a Divine Imperative. Ockham's 
impact, for Pinckaers, is huge. Only too soon Christians begin to see 
their moral legacy through "nominalist lenses." (253) 
This "revision" is at issue when we compare Ockham's freedom of 
indifference with Aquinas's "freedom for excellence." Mapping this 
contrast is the fourth of Pinckaers' key themes. For Ockham, he notes, 
freedom opposes natural inclination and law; it is, in a sense, brute self-
assertion independent of the agent's character. For Aquinas, however, 
we find free choice in the developing interplay of reason with will; it 
expresses an inclination for what seems good, and wise law serves its 
development. Without virtue freedom is farce, and absent the finality of 
happiness freedom has no direction. 
Pinckaers's basic argument for freedom of excellence is that it reflects 
the intricate fabric of our experience. Part of that experience is our quest 
to show it intelligible. Aquinas offers a way intelligibly to join who we 
are with how we (best) live. His ethics seeks to account for the dynam-
ics of our anthropology. But if we divorce ethics from anthropology, we 
forgo a deepening reflection on the ways of life that realize our nature, 
and do so only for an elaborate exercise in the arbitrary. 
This last claim, of course, itself expresses the Christian view that our 
nature is not arbitrary. Rather it is made in the image of God. As ratio-
nal and free, we are persons and it is in our personhood that we image 
God. Indeed, Pinckaers affirms, and we see this as the fifth of his key 
themes, that "Natural law is the foundation of human rights, as it roots 
them in our personal nature." (452) With this claim, explicated by 
Revelation's Good News about God's nature and involvement in ours, 
Pinckaers goes to the core of his praxis. He parallels John Paul II's 
Veritatis Splendor with its harmony of freedom, nature and grace. 
A classic begins or reshapes deep projects. Does Sources? Pinckaers 
rethinks the Christian tradition in light of the primacy of happiness. He 
illuminates insights of the tradition to dispute now dominant assump-
tions about freedom. But a classic equally invites still more analysis, so I 
will suggest two lines of inquiry. 
First, the "free will defense" has long played a key role in responding 
to the problem of evil. But if we understand freedom as motivated by 
natural inclination, why does not God create us with less confused incli-
nations? Or why not, at any rate, with less confusion about them? It is 
not that to be free we must act independently of inclinations; indeed, 
they make our freedom possible. But the plot thickens: suppose God 
makes it clear wherein perfect happiness lies or even that a particular 
action is required for that happiness. If this be so, will we surely not 
choose happiness or at least the action that it requires? But how then are 
we free? In reply to the thickening plot, Aquinas says that we might yet 
will not to think of happiness or its requirements and that there is a real 
distinction between acts of will and of intellect. (395) But should God 
have willed this distinction? The discussion is not over. 
Pinckaers does not write in the analytic mode. And yet one would 
like him to address the logician's view of freedom as a three-place predi-
cate: S is free from C to do A. Determinists deny freedom because, they 
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say, its negative condition is not met. Causality reigns. Compatibilists 
allow for freedom if the causes at issue are within the agent. But that 
proviso strikes libertarians (and others) as empty. Still, what are we to 
make of actions that are "authored" by a libertarian self both metaphysi-
cally and historically unimaginable? 
For Pinckaers, we become free. We do so in becoming free from what 
impedes the cooperation of reason and will and thus free for the good 
which attracts us. So we are neither determinists nor libertarians. But 
are we compatibilists? Surely not in a Humean sense; perhaps not in 
any sense. What, then, is the Christian view in the modern context? 
How do we engage the established disorder if our identity is unclear? 
La lotta continua. 
Faith and Criticism, by Basil Mitchell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. 
Pp.173. $29.95 (Cloth) 
WILLIAM P. ALSTON, Syracuse University 
The central problem dealt with in this book is whether openness to criti-
cism is compatible with the strong commitment essential to religious 
faith. Mitchell approaches the problem by contrasting what he calls lib-
erals and conservatives in theology. Evincing keen awareness of the ambi-
guity of these terms, he stipulates the following understanding . 
. .. within all the mainstream churches there is a sharp division 
between those who take it for granted that Christian theology 
should be studied critically with the aid of all the resources of 
modern scholarship and with due attention to all that is received 
as knowledge in the modern world [liberals], and those who 
resist this trend as destructive of the historic faith of Christians 
[conservatives] (1) 
Mitchell's presentation of this contrast is notable for bringing out the 
way in which fundamentalists and radical thinkers like D. Z. Phillips 
share a rejection of the possibility that extra-religious knowledge could 
overthrow Christian faith, despite their very different versions of this 
conviction. 
The central issue of the book then emerges from a conservative criti-
cism of liberal theology. 
Christian faith is unconditional. It demands our complete and 
whole-hearted allegiance. But to allow Christian belief to be 
exposed to criticism implies that criticism might turn out to be 
fatal. Once it is allowed that faith is, in principle, vulnerable to 
criticism, its character is bound to change. In place of the total 
commitment which is demanded of Christians we have a faith 
which is tentative and provisional. (4) 
